THE
SAINTS!
Did
you see Hank Paulson and Alan Greenspan on Meet the Press Sunday? Both betting
on the Colts? (I also disagree with their view that we mustn’t let
Bush’s tax-cuts-on-income-above $250,000 a year expire. More on that
tomorrow, or soon.)
ALBANIA
BANS DISCRIMINATION – COULD AMERICA BE NEXT?
Last
Thursday, Albania’s parliament unanimously banned
discrimination on the grounds of various characteristics, including sexual
orientation and gender identity. No one expects the U.S. Congress to be as
enlightened, but it’s at least something to shoot for.
Dripping
sarcasm aside, one really does hope we follow countries like South
Africa, Belgium, Canada, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden – and now Albania – as quickly as
possible.
After
all, it was we who invented life, liberty – equal rights –
and the pursuit of happiness. No?
CHINA
(AND ASIA) – NOT SO FAST
China’s
future may be bright, as suggested in yesterday’s excerpt (and who among
us would not wish good things for a sixth of humanity?).
But this
equally fascinating piece from Sunday’s Boston Globe by Joshua Kurlantzick (thanks, Nick!)
argues that expectations China will lead the world are overdone:
.
. . Asia’s growth has built-in stumbling blocks. Demographics,
for one. Because of its One Child policy, China’s population is aging
rapidly: According to one comprehensive study by the Center for Strategic
and International Studies, a Washington think tank, by 2040 China will have at
least 400 million elderly, most of whom will have no retirement pensions. This
aging poses a severe challenge, since China may not have enough working-age
people to support its elderly. In other words, says CSIS, China will grow old
before it grows rich, a disastrous combination. Other Asian powers also are
aging rapidly - Japan’s population likely will fall from around 130
million today to 90 million in 2055 - or, due to traditional preferences for
male children, have a dangerous sex imbalance in which there are far more men
than women. This is a scenario likely to destabilize a country, since, at other
periods in history when many men could not marry, the unmarried hordes turned
to crime or political violence.
Looming political unrest also threatens
Asia’s rise. China alone already faces some 90,000 annual “mass
incidents,” the name given by Chinese security forces to protests,
and this number is likely to grow as income inequality soars and environmental
problems add more stresses to society. India, too, faces severe threats. The
Naxalites, Maoists operating mostly in eastern India who attack large
landowners, businesses, police, and other local officials, have caused the
death of at least 800 people last year alone, and have destabilized large
portions of eastern India. Other Asian states, too, face looming unrest, from
the ongoing insurgency in southern Thailand to the rising racial and religious
conflicts in Malaysia.
Also, despite predictions that Asia will eventually
integrate, building a European Union-like organization, the region actually
seems to be coming apart. Asia has not tamed the menace of nationalism,
which Europe and North America largely have put in the past, albeit after two
bloody world wars. Even as China and India have cooperated on climate change,
on many other issues they are at each other’s throats. Over the past
year, both countries have fortified their common border in the Himalayas,
claiming overlapping pieces of territory. Meanwhile, Japan is constantly
seeking ways to blunt Chinese military power. People in many Asian nations have
extremely negative views of their neighbors - even though they maintain
positive images of the United States.
More broadly, few Asian leaders have any idea what
values, ideas, or histories should hold Asia together. “The argument of
an Asian century is fundamentally flawed in that Asia is a Western concept, one
that is not widely agreed upon [in Asia],” says Devin Stewart, a Japan
specialist at the Carnegie Council for Ethics and International Affairs.
Even as Asia’s miracle seems, on closer
inspection, less miraculous, America’s decline has been vastly
overstated. To become a global superpower requires economic, political, and
military might, and on the last two counts, the United States remains leagues
ahead of any Asian rival. Despite boosting defense budgets by 20 percent
annually, Asian powers like India, China, or Indonesia will not rival the US
military for decades, if ever - only the Pentagon could launch a war in a place
like Afghanistan, so far from its homeland. When a tsunami struck South and
Southeast Asia five years ago, the region’s nations, including Indonesia,
Thailand, and India, had to rely on the US Navy to coordinate relief efforts.
America also has other advantages that will be
nearly impossible to remove. With Asian nations still squabbling amongst
themselves, many look to the United States as a neutral power broker, a role
America plays around the world. German writer and scholar Joseph Joffe calls
the United States today the “default power”: No one in the world
trusts anyone else to play the global hegemon, so it still falls to Washington.
Even in the economic realm, the United States
remains strong. As Zakaria admits, the United States accounted for 32
percent of global output in 1913, 26 percent in 1960, and 26 percent in 2007,
remarkably consistent figures. The United States remains atop nearly every
ranking of economies according to openness and innovation. While
Asia’s centrally planned economies can build infrastructure without
worrying about public opposition - China has built impressive networks of
airports and highways - they are less successful at nurturing world-beating
companies, which thrive on risk-taking and hands-off government. Compared to
Intel, Google, or Apple, China’s major companies still are state-linked
behemoths that do little innovation of their own. The leading corporations
in most other Asian nations (with the exception of Japan and South Korea) also
are either giant state-linked firms or trading companies that invest little in
innovation. And censorship or tight government controls alienate the most
innovative firms - Google is now threatening to pull out of China entirely.
As Asia throws up barriers to immigration, in the
United States immigration helps ensure long-term economic vitality. Chinese and
Indian immigrants accounted for almost one-quarter of all companies in Silicon Valley,
according to research by AnnaLee Saxenian at the University of
California-Berkeley. According to the most comprehensive global ranking of
universities, compiled by Shanghai Jiao Tong University, American schools,
powered by immigrants and flush with cash, dominate the top 100, with Harvard
ranked first. Asia has no schools in the top 10.
Most important, the United States is a champion of
an idea that has global appeal, and Asia is not. During the opposition
protests in Iran, demonstrators look to the United States, not China or
Indonesia or even India, to make a statement. In a reversal of the Iranian
regime’s rhetoric, some protestors even chant “Death to
China” because of Beijing’s support for the repressive government
in Tehran. As long as protestors in places like Iran, or Burma or Ukraine,
call out for the American president, and not China’s leader or
India’s prime minister, the United States will remain the preeminent
power.
To be the global hegemon requires military, economic,
and political might, but it also means offering a vision for the world. As
Mahbubani admits, during Britain’s imperial period, elites in places like
Malaya, India, or the Caribbean wanted to study in England, or read British
authors and philosophers, because they believed that the ideas Britain had
imparted - the rule of law, the Westminster political system, an idea of fair
play, a meritocratic civil service, evidence-based scientific exploration - had
merit for the entire world. Even men and women who, ultimately, became some of
the biggest thorns in Britain’s side, like Jawarhal Nehru, cherished
their British studies and their links to British culture.
So, too, since World War II the United States has
been, for many foreign publics, the nation looked up to in this way. Even at
the worst moments, such as the period after 9/11 in which the Bush
administration created the prison at Guantanamo Bay and allowed torture and
other questionable tactics, I have rarely met anyone, in any country, who
wanted to move to China, or India, or even Japan, rather than the United
States. Foreigners may want to spend a few years in China or India or
Indonesia, to see the dynamism of these places, but few, if any, have plans to
become Chinese, Indian, or Indonesian citizens. Perhaps one day China or
Indonesia or India will draw these migrants, who would come seeking the same
dreams and openness as they do today in the United States. But it won’t
be soon - and it might not even be this century.
Joshua Kurlantzick is a Fellow at the Council on
Foreign Relations.
☞ And here is James
Fallows in The Atlantic, having just returned from three years in China,
with an equally fascinating take.
. . . Through
the entirety of my conscious life, America has been on the brink of ruination,
or so we have heard, from the launch of Sputnik through whatever is
the latest indication of national falling apart or falling behind. Pick a year
over the past half century, and I will supply an indicator of what at the time
seemed a major turning point for the worse. The first oil shocks and
gas-station lines in peacetime history; the first presidential resignation
ever; assassinations and riots; failing schools; failing industries; polarized
politics; vulgarized culture; polluted air and water; divisive and inconclusive
wars. It all seemed so terrible, during a period defined in retrospect as a
time of unquestioned American strength. “Through the 1970s, people seemed
ready to conclude that the world was coming to an end at the drop of a
hat,” Rick Perlstein, the author of Nixonland, told me. “Thomas Jefferson was
probably sure the country was going to hell when John Adams supported the Alien
and Sedition Acts,” said Gary Hart, the former Democratic senator and
presidential candidate. “And Adams was sure it was going to hell when
Thomas Jefferson was elected president.” . . .
☞ The Fallows piece is actually more colorful and
anecdotal than the Kurlantzick piece – you’ll enjoy it, if you have
time.
But just as many scoffed at the notion that U.S. home prices
could ever go down – the worry of a few perennial
Cassandras – so could it be a mistake to underestimate the work we
need to do to remain competitive.